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Between 1900 and 1970 Dutch water management became a “hydraulic technocracy.” This does not 
mean that civil engineers literally exercised political 
power as leaders, ministers, or parliamentarians—
though they did all of these. “Technocracy” in this case 
was a situation in which engineers tackled problems in 
the sphere of water management and road transport—
according to their own perspective. This “technocracy” 
rested on a power to identify problems and imagine solu-
tions without really having to take into account the opin-
ions of non-experts. It rested in part on the ascendance of 
what Monte Calvert famously called “school culture” over 
traditional “shop culture”: the replacement of empirical 
knowledge by authoritative “engineering science.” 
The laws on the two largest coastal engineering proj-
ects of the twentieth century—the closing and reclama-
tion of the Zuiderzee (passed in 1918) and the so-called 
Delta Works to dam off the estuaries in the southwest 
part of the country (passed in 1957)—were symptomatic 
of this technocratic spirit. They were inspired by exhaus-
tive studies and recommendations by leading civil engi-
neers who themselves had defined the problem and the 
therapy. Moreover, the texts of the laws themselves were 
extremely succinct—taking no more than a few pages in 
the parliamentary record to sketch the basic features of 
the project. All the details regarding the kinds of infra-
structure, the timing, the method of construction, and so 
on were not dictated and were regarded as the preroga-
tive of the engineers. Hence, within a flexible mandate 
and an elastic budget, civil engineers, and the Rijkswa-
terstaat in particular, came to enjoy enormous latitude 
in defining and solving their own problems. During 
this period large parts of the Netherlands became their 
hydraulic playground and the organizations they led and 
staffed became among the most powerful in the country.
This new hydraulic technocracy was not only a shift 
in power from lawyers and bureaucrats to engineers, 
it also involved a new scale of planning and building. 
Although the idea of “hydraulic systems” was by no 
means novel—as in the river management in the nine-
teenth century—after the turn of the century it gradu-
ally became a cornerstone of Dutch hydraulic engi-
neering. Whereas “projects” had been the basic unit of 
engineering imagination in the nineteenth century, now 
regional and even national “systems” became the domi-
nant mode. This approach was coupled to new kinds of 
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systematic knowledge and, eventually, more centralized 
hydraulic administrations. Both were fostered in turn 
by the promotion of engineering education from the 
sphere of secondary education to that of higher educa-
tion in 1905. In that year, the Delft Engineering School, 
which had a monopoly on the education of state engi-
neers, became the Delft Technical High School, equiva-
lent to the classical universities in everything but the 
name. Its professors were granted the Ius Promovendi, 
which not only increased the prestige of the engineering 
sciences but proved to be an important stimulus for 
fundamental applied science research—including 
research in civil engineering.
There had been few indications during the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century that this kind of technocratic 
future was in the offing. On the contrary, many signs 
pointed to the dawning of a new populist era in Dutch 
politics and, by the same token, water management. This 
had to do with the gradual erosion of liberal hegemony by 
new political movements. Although the liberal revolution 
of 1848 had given an immense impetus to the consolida-
tion of national water management and to the imple-
mentation of a great number of water management and 
infrastructural projects, by the 1880s the liberal engine had 
begun sputtering. By then the liberal example had created 
space, institutions, and resources for new social move-
ments that were challenging the old liberal monopoly 
and making politics more complex and contentious. After 
1870, Catholics and socialists also began an assault on 
state power, and by the end of that decade a progressive 
liberal movement was taking shape that challenged both 
the old liberals’ unconcern with the social injustice gener-
ated by unbridled industrialization as well as their horror 
of a state that intervened in the free market system.
It may have seemed that in this new era every-
thing—including water management—would be utterly 
politicized. The ideological mobilization of the public, 
especially in new “populist” Catholic and socialist 
political movements, promised an active, alert citizenry 
that would impress its will on the state and make its 
own demands in the fields of infrastructure and water 
management. As the poet Albert Verwey, co-founder of 
the influential literary and political journal De Nieuwe 
Gids (1885), put it: “This is a time of passion, rather than 
of introspection.” People “have things to say that brook 
no delay and their movements are the movements of 
people that suddenly take action.”1 This cultural climate 
stood in sharp contrast to the era of classical liberalism 
in which the spokesmen of commerce, industry, and 
liberal ideology were the moving forces, using the state 
as a tool to ease the way of economic progress and to 
secure the physical integrity of the land. 
Water management became embedded in this 
politicized and “pillarized” world. It was now potentially 
a bone of contention among the political pillars. The 
rise of religious pillars with strong constituencies in the 
countryside or a specific regional focus on the Catholic 
south, threatened to make water management once 
again a contentious business. Protestant agrarian inter-
ests pursued improved drainage and water management 
of small rivers and the reclamation of “wild lands” in the 
eastern part of the country. The Catholic pillar clamored 
for similar measures in the Catholic provinces of North 
Brabant and Limburg, with the Limburg bourgeoisie 
also advocating the canalization of the Dutch Meuse. 
Nonetheless, there were many regional projects 
that represented a generic (that is, non-pillarized) 
interest in safety, economic progress, and competitive-
ness. This applied to reclamations, flood control, and 
especially to waterways. In the second half of the nine-
teenth century the classical liberals had enlarged and 
upgraded the waterways in the core western provinces; 
there was now an ever-increasing clamor to extend 
this core network into the peripheries. The Zuiderzee 
closure, the Meuse canalization, and a project for a 
canal system between the Twente textile cities and the 
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Rhine were all examples of this new regionalism, as 
well as the improvement of the peripheral harbors of 
Vlissingen, Delfzijl, and Harlingen. Because until 1918 
parliamentarians were elected on a regional basis, 
water management was handled in Parliament on the 
basis of local and regional interests. Successive govern-
ments had to maintain at least the appearance of 
equitable distribution of resources among the regions. 
While this did not absolutely paralyze progress, it did 
demand long and tedious negotiations that consider-
ably slowed the pace of water management projects 
during the first two or three decades of the twentieth 
century. This phenomenon might be viewed as a Dutch 
version of American “pork barrel” politics.
The new pillarized and regionalized politics of 
water management also had negative effects on the 
Rijkswaterstaat during this period. While the orga-
nization had flourished under the liberal “project,” 
it seemed to flounder in the new and much more 
complex world of political water management. This 
may have been due in part to its own basically regional 
organization—with the provincial directorates identi-
fying first and foremost with their own provincial water 
management interests. Up to and through World War 
I (in which the Netherlands remained neutral) the 
Rijkswaterstaat proved incapable of exercising leader-
ship in the domain of water management. Matters were 
not helped by the fact that the organization was also 
Weir at Grave, one of the weir construction projects in the Meuse canalization program, 
aimed at facilitating navigation for bulk transport, completed in 1929
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struggling to master a number of new civil engineering 
technologies, including electrical power, reinforced 
concrete, and steel construction. 
However, in the 1920s a new spirit seized hold of 
the Rijkswaterstaat and the new Dienst der Zuiderzee-
werken (Zuiderzee Service). Hydraulic imagination 
began to transcend local and regional projects and to 
conceive of national systems of flood control, navigation, 
and fresh water supply. New technologies were applied 
and their impact carefully studied. The new élan was 
confirmed by the reorganization of the Rijkswaterstaat 
in 1930, which shifted power from the provincial periph-
eries to a national command center and provided new 
organizational niches for specialization and research. 
Although the Zuiderzee Works were carried out by a 
formally independent organization, several of its leading 
engineers were former Rijkswaterstaat employees, and 
the new style of planning and construction was rapidly 
adopted by the Rijkswaterstaat as well. During the 1930s, 
for example, the theoretical groundwork was laid for 
the Delta Works that were carried out in the wake of the 
massive 1953 flood.
The long period of reconstruction after World War 
II provided ideal conditions for reinforcing the new 
interventionist state and developing a strong central 
planning dynamic. Doing so was mainly a reaction to 
the economic recession of the 1930s and the chaos and 
devastation of the war. But the example of the German 
Normalization of the Meuse River, ca. 1935
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occupation had ironically fostered a new apprecia-
tion of a strong central administration’s planning role, 
symbolized by the appointment of Rijkswaterstaat 
boss Johannes Ringers to the post of commissioner for 
reconstruction during the occupation. The experiences 
of the period 1930–1945 left their mark on the postwar 
social and political climate. There was a widespread 
call for more government coordination. There were also 
inspiring foreign examples: Roosevelt’s New Deal was 
admired by many; and the 1942 report, Social Insurance 
and Allied Services, by the British economist and politi-
cian W. H. Beveridge, containing proposals to set up 
a social security system and a national health system, 
was also influential in the Netherlands. In the 1950s and 
1960s, consecutive Dutch governments increased state 
intervention in many fields. Until 1960, the government 
determined wage levels in every economic branch; 
it designed ambitious industrial development plans; 
it planned huge housing production schemes; and it 
invested heavily in the national infrastructure. In this 
period of frenzied modernization, nature was sacrificed 
to industrial zones and traditional landscapes were 
transformed into large-scale agricultural plots in the 
interest of improving agricultural productivity. 
After 1960 the Dutch welfare state came into 
being and with it a variety of new allocations and 
benefits. Though there was a basic consensus among 
the political parties about these kinds of government 
re-allocation, they disagreed about the extent and the 
scope. The Social-Democrats were strongly committed 
to the planned economy; the Christian-Democrats, on 
the other hand, were rather reluctant to support big 
government. Instead, they set out to create tripartite 
consultative institutions, where government, busi-
ness representatives, and labor unions held discus-
sions and gave advice about social-economic issues. 
These institutions, the Social-Economic Council 
(Sociaal-Economische Raad) and the Labor Founda-
tion (Stichting van de Arbeid), were successful instru-
ments for reaching compromises on a wide range of 
issues. Between 1948 and 1958 the Christian-Democrats 
and Social-Democrats formed government coalitions. 
After that, the Liberals replaced the Social-Democrats. 
Nonetheless, by international standards, government 
intervention remained strong. In 1946 the Liberal leader, 
Pieter Oud, made a cautious, but revealing remark: he 
was not against government planning, he said, provided 
its scope did not exceed certain limits. Oud’s flexibility 
mirrored not only contemporary liberalism’s underdog 
role, but also its conceptual pallor.2
The era between 1940 and 1970 was also shaped by 
great confidence in technology and its problem-solving 
capacities, an attitude that was already discernible in the 
Johannes Aleidis Ringers (1885–1965), director-general 
of the Rijkswaterstaat (1930–1935) and Commissioner 
for Reconstruction (1940–1943)
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1920s and 1930s. Engineers had an exalted professional 
status and their unchallenged social position certainly 
helped to legitimize government policies, to a consider-
able extent shaped by top-down planning, research and, 
in general, expert opinion. Technical education was 
expanded further with the establishment of two new 
technical universities, at Eindhoven (1956) and Twente 
(1961). Technical vocational training also attracted more 
students as more special technical schools were created. 
A rational, confident, forward-looking orienta-
tion was widespread in Dutch society, fostered by the 
economic boom, full employment, and rising prosperity.3 
Besides, until the late sixties, the leaders of the main 
ideological pillars—Social-Democrats, Protestants, and 
Catholics—cooperated on critical social issues, while 
simultaneously keeping their adher-
ents under control. In this climate 
of political stability, respect for 
authority, general confidence in tech-
nical solutions, and a growing govern-
ment budget, the Rijkswaterstaat’s 
power grew to unprecedented heights. 
Repairing the immense war 
damage (under the Rijkswaterstaat’s 
supervision) had been the first item 
on the agenda in 1945. Numerous 
bridges were rebuilt and waterways 
were swept clear of wrecks and mines. 
Once this emergency work was done, 
a huge infrastructure construction 
program shifted into gear. A freeway 
network, outlined in national schemes 
published from 1927 onwards, was 
built; new canals were constructed 
and existing ones enlarged; sluices, 
bridges, and tunnels were built. In 
1952 the Amsterdam-Rhine Canal 
was finished: upon completion, the 
huge locks at Tiel were the largest in Europe. In 1953 
the Twente Canal was opened for shipping. It also 
served regional drainage. Canals in Noord-Brabant and 
Friesland followed. In 1957, after much delay, the Rijks-
waterstaat completed its first tunnel at Velsen, under 
the North Sea canal.4 The opening attracted so many car 
drivers that a traffic jam ensued—still a rare phenom-
enon for that time. A spectacular project, carried out in a 
partnership with the city of Rotterdam, was the seaward 
expansion of the Rotterdam Harbor. The Rijkswaterstaat 
built a new harbor entrance on the coast and created a 
huge harbor development zone (Europoort), where not 
only shipping quays but also petrochemical plants were 
set up. In response to a request by American shipping 
companies, the quays and industrial parks were designed 
Beatrix Lock in the Amsterdam-Rhine Canal; see map in chapter 1
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at a height of 5 meters (16.4 feet) above mean sea level. 
These projects were supported by the Rijkswaterstaat’s 
new research departments, built up since the late 1920s, 
and epitomizing the Rijkswaterstaat’s dominance vis-à-
vis the provinces and the water boards. The provinces, 
swept along with the current, likewise expanded and 
improved their provincial canal and road networks. 
OLD IMPULSES, NEW CONCERNS, AND NEW TOOLS
During this long period between the turn of the century 
and the turn of the political tide in 1970, the two tradi-
tional pillars of Dutch national water management—
floods and waterways—were joined by a third, water 
quality. The threats of floods, from swollen rivers and 
storm-swept seas, continued to be the main prod to 
national activity in the field of water management. Three 
floods in particular had a big impact: the Zuiderzee 
flood of 1916, the Meuse River floods in Gelderland, 
Brabant, and Limburg in 1926, and finally the disaster 
of February 1953, which inundated a good part of the 
southwestern delta. As in the past, these disasters were 
powerful catalysts for initiating costly engineering plans. 
The record flooding on the Meuse in 1926 was a 
call to arms. The responsible engineer, Cornelis Willem 
Lely, immediately drew up a plan to improve the river’s 
discharge capacity so that it could handle high river 
stages without flooding and without the infamous Beers 
floodway as a relief valve. Lely was the son of  Cornelis 
Lely, the spiritual father of the Zuiderzee works, as 
discussed below.5 Lely’s plan was basically to normalize 
the river between Blauwe Kamer and Grave (the site 
of the most downstream weir complex of the existing 
Shell’s oil refinery at the huge petrochemical complex in Europoort, symbolizing 
the expansion of the Rotterdam harbor after 1945
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canalization project completed between 1919 and 1929). 
The plan proposed rectification—that is, elimination 
of meanders—and normalization—that is, achieving 
uniform channel breadth and depth. In order to ensure 
sufficient draught for navigation in the streamlined river 
at low stages, Lely also proposed extending the existing 
canalization downstream by building a final weir at Lith. 
The ten-year project was started in 1932, at the height of 
the Great Depression, and was financed in part under 
a public works scheme that enabled Rijkswaterstaat to 
conscript unemployed laborers.6 Both of the other major 
hydraulic projects of this period—the enclosure of the 
Zuiderzee and the Delta Works—were also initiated in 
response to extensive floods. These tragedies converged 
with the emergence of the more proactive engineering 
culture, at least among Rijkswaterstaat engineers. Plans 
to prevent catastrophes were now being made ahead of 
their actual occurrence, even though it often still took 
the disaster itself to get the plans through Parliament. 
The second traditional driver in the field of water 
management was nautical transport, extending as far 
back as the reign of King William I, the “canal-king.” This 
driver did not apply only to the “core” waterways system 
centered on the harbors of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, 
with their artificial seaways and the large-scale rivers 
and canals connecting them to distant hinterlands. After 
the turn of the century, industrial and mining centers 
in the peripheries also demanded competitive modern 
connections to the core waterways system. These pres-
sures kept Rijkswaterstaat at work. Not only the Twente 
canal was built in this period, but in the 1920s several 
Meuse sections were canalized and in the 1930s the 
Meuse section bordering on Belgium was bypassed by 
constructing the Juliana Canal.
Canalization of the Meuse in Dutch Limburg had 
been contemplated since the 1860s, inspired partly by 
the example of Belgium, where large sections of the 
Meuse were being canalized at that time. A joint Dutch-
Belgian Commission (1906–1912) presented an ambi-
tious canalization report, including the canalization of 
the common “Border Meuse,” but World War I inter-
vened. After the war the Dutch developed these plans 
into their own canalization scheme for the Dutch Meuse 
downstream of the Border Meuse, spurred by a pressing 
demand for cheap coal transport from the highly 
productive Limburg coal mines. To enable navigation at 
different river stages, Rijkswaterstaat designed five huge 
movable weir complexes between the towns of Linne and 
Grave, adapting British, Swiss, and German technology 
to the situation of the Meuse. The canalization scheme, 
carried out between 1919 and 1929, thus became an 
open-air school for Rijkswaterstaat engineers in which 
they learned how to integrate technologies of reinforced 
concrete, steel construction, and electrical power into 
complex weir and lock designs.7
However, in contrast to the previous period, the 
rivers and waterways were no longer the main act, 
although major river management and navigation proj-
ects continued to be executed. The most spectacular 
projects were the two “flood-management” systems 
mentioned above, involving a drastic reduction of the 
length of coastline that could be exposed to the ravages 
of storms and storm surges at sea.
As early as the 1930s, the old impulses of navi-
gation improvement and flood management were 
joined by concerns about the very quality of fresh 
water. “Pure” water—or at least water that could be 
used for macro-hydraulic, agricultural, and domestic 
purposes—gradually became scarce. This shortage was 
due in part to increased demand, as a result of popu-
lation increase, the growth of greenhouse farming, 
and industrialization; in part to increasingly stringent 
quality demands made possible by improved analytic 
techniques; and in part to the increasing pollution 
of fresh water by both urban and industrial polluters 
and by saline intrusions from the sea. Surface water 
162
Two Centuries of Experience in Water Resources Management
salinity was considerably increased by the large new 
seaways connecting Rotterdam and Amsterdam to 
the sea. These were not only highways for world trade, 
but also conduits for salt water from the sea. Another 
source of salinity was the Rhine, which was burdened 
by increasing amounts of salt waste from German 
coal mines and industries and later from the Alsa-
tian potash mines. This situation was a double-bind 
because it was only thanks to the Rhine’s copious 
supplies of fresh water that Dutch water managers were 
able to keep the maritime salt intrusions at bay and 
to flush the polders—at least in times of moderate to 
high river stages. This new set of issues began to shape 
the water management agenda on its own, ultimately 
to become integrated into the more traditional flood 
control projects and transportation infrastructure.
The scope and scale of the new water manage-
ment agenda had its counterpart in a new range of 
basic technologies that had emerged by the turn of 
the century. New tools, theories, methods, materials, 
and energy sources held the promise of a revolution 
in civil engineering practice. Reinforced concrete and 
steel construction made it possible to build large and 
strong monolithic structures at previously unimagined 
scales. Electricity was a flexible conveyor of energy and 
a subtle medium of control. Sheet-piling and deep-well 
pumping created a way of realizing ever deeper foun-
dation pits. New hydrodynamic theories and experi-
mental methods provided safe guides to increasingly 
daring and cost-effective designs. All these innovations 
promised dramatic increases in both the scale and 
subtlety of civil engineering projects. The major chal-
lenge for the Dutch civil engineering community in 
general, and Rijkswaterstaat in particular, was how to 
appropriate these new technological promises into an 
effective and efficient management structure. There 
was a thin line between caution and conservatism that 
was not always appreciated by outsiders and politi-
cians, and on several occasions—especially in the first 
three decades of the twentieth century—it proved diffi-
cult for the Rijkswaterstaat to justify its claim to being 
the most competent and technologically advanced actor 
in Dutch water management. 
 Lack of trust influenced the 1918 decision not to 
charge the Rijkswaterstaat with the enclosure and recla-
mation of the Zuiderzee. The government’s decision to 
entrust this mammoth project to a new agency directly 
responsible to the minister was a serious blow to the 
Rijkswaterstaat’s self-esteem. The general dissatisfac-
tion with the performance of the Rijkswaterstaat since 
the 1890s in fact prompted the minister to appoint a 
commission (the so-called Rosenwald Commission) 
to prepare plans for a thorough reorganization. The 
decision to exclude Rijkswaterstaat from the Zuiderzee 
Cornelis Lely (1854–1929)
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works was taken by a minister of waterstaat, commerce, 
and industry who was himself a civil engineer, Cornelis 
Lely. As a young engineer in the service of the Zuiderzee 
Association, a private lobby group promoting closure 
and reclamation of the Zuiderzee, Lely had in 1891 
himself proposed the scheme that would ultimately be 
carried out. The lethargy, conservatism, and outright 
skepticism of the Rijkswaterstaat at the time had appar-
ently made such an impression that, years later, Lely 
still had a very negative image of the agency and judged 
it unfit to undertake the project.8 Lely’s immediate 
successor as minister, the Catholic electrical engineer 
and former professor at Delft, G. J. Van Swaay, had 
similar problems with the Rijkswaterstaat in connec-
tion with the canalization of the Meuse. In response to 
a dispute about an appropriate design for the weir at 
Grave, he lectured his two inspectors-general as follows: 
It has given me very little satisfaction to be 
forced to conclude that the study of the requested 
information has been carried out with such 
a lack of initiative, that so little independent 
judgement has been manifested and that, out 
of the conflict of opinions among those whom I 
have asked for advice, no clearly circumscribed 
proposals have been forthcoming.9
All this changed for the better after 1930 when, 
partly in response to the 1926 report of the Rosenwald 
Commission, the Rijkswaterstaat was reorganized. 
Although the outmoded regionally based structure was 
not abolished, it was encapsulated in a much more 
hierarchically organized command structure which 
considerably shortened the interminable internal 
debates that had previously paralyzed action. The orga-
nization was now headed by a single director-general 
who not only had very strong powers within the agency 
but who also was directly responsible to the minister, 
thus shortening the chain of command by bypassing a 
separate hydraulic bureaucracy in the ministry itself. 
The first incumbent of this post—perhaps fortunately 
for the Rijkswaterstaat—was the brilliant civil engineer 
Johannes Aleidis Ringers.10 
Ringers had been a student of the prolific Jacob 
Kraus who, as professor of civil engineering and rector 
at Delft in the first decade of the new century—and later 
as minister of waterstaat—had propagated the modern-
ization of Dutch civil engineering as a scientifically 
innovative and economically oriented discipline.11 As a 
Rijkswaterstaat engineer, Ringers carried this concept of 
civil engineering to new heights. As early as 1912 he had 
designed and supervised the highly innovative construc-
tion of a large lock at Hansweert in the canal through 
South Beveland on the waterway between Rotterdam 
and Antwerp. At Hansweert, Ringers created what was 
arguably the Netherlands’ first economically rational 
construction site, utilizing a number of innovative tech-
nologies. He applied electrically powered deep-well 
pumping to keep the deep construction pit dry; he used 
reinforced concrete for the piling, floors, sills, and walls 
of the lock; and he employed the first of many floatable 
riveted-steel horizontal rolling lock-doors to be used in 
Dutch locks.12 In the mid-1920s he applied these early 
lessons to the world-class North Lock at IJmuiden at 
the entrance to the North Sea Canal. This lock, which 
for many years after its completion in 1930 remained 
the largest in the world, also pushed the envelope on 
numerous points of design and construction. Among 
other things, the innovative use of scale-model experi-
ments (at Prof. H. Krey’s Preussische Versuchsanstalt 
für Wasser- und Schiffsbau in Berlin) enabled Ringers 
to save a million guilders—a huge sum in 1921—by 
replacing the cumbersome longitudinal filling mani-
folds in the lock walls with short tunnels circumventing 
the doors.13 Doing so made it possible to construct the 
walls much thinner, lighter, and higher, and hence more 
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cheaply. Upon the completion of the lock, he served 
as president-director of the contractors’ conglom-
erate charged with building the dam to close off the 
Zuiderzee. Two years later he was appointed the first 
chief of the new Directorate of the Waterstaat, with the 
title of director-general and directly responsible to the 
minister. The new directorate included both the Rijks-
waterstaat and the Zuiderzee Service.
Ringers applied his considerable technical and orga-
nizational experience to restoring a sense of purpose and 
dignity to the Rijkswaterstaat. He set about his task with 
patience, taking two years to produce his master plan 
for reorganization. Meanwhile he recruited a number 
of like-minded engineers to fill vacancies in leadership 
positions and he created several new specialist agencies 
that could begin to function as the innovative “brains” 
of the organization. Contrary to what some expected, 
Ringers’ plan left the old regional organizational struc-
ture more or less intact. Though there were good reasons 
to do so, this aspect of the plan has also been interpreted 
as a smokescreen serving to quash potential dissent by 
hiding Ringer’s real objective of relocating the Rijks-
waterstaat’s dynamism to specialist departments partly 
outside the regional structure.14 He himself set the prec-
edent by arranging for the construction of the North Lock 
at IJmuiden to be organized as an independent project 
directly under the minister’s supervision and indepen-
dent of the Rijkswaterstaat’s regional structure.
Ringers also made crucial decisions that finally put 
the plans for a national hydraulic experimental station on 
a firm footing. In view of the Rijkswaterstaat’s increasing 
use of hydraulic scale models, it would have been conve-
The IJmuiden North Lock construction site, ca. 1925
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nient for it to have had its own in-house hydraulic labora-
tory, but Ringers recognized the value of an independent 
academic standing in cases where scale-model experi-
ments were necessary to resolve disputes about hydraulic 
projects.15 The new laboratory was therefore organized as 
a foundation in which the Rijkswaterstaat participated, 
but it was organizationally integrated into and physi-
cally located at the Technical High School at Delft and 
used partly as a teaching laboratory by Delft’s Civil Engi-
neering Department. 
The creation, in 1930, of the Research Service for 
the Tidal Rivers within a Directorate for Tidal Rivers 
was particularly consequential. This agency, headed by 
the extremely bright, ambitious, and headstrong engi-
neer Dr. Johan van Veen, was charged with mapping, 
measuring, and producing plans for what Ringers 
described as the “general improvement” of the tidal 
rivers and estuaries in the southwest part of the country. 
Over the course of the 1930s, Van Veen and his staff 
would transform this mandate into a research project to 
calculate the propagation of marine storm surges into 
the Dutch estuaries and further upstream, including the 
construction of a huge electromechanical analog tidal 
computer. They also advanced a number of schemes for 
radical reconstruction of the estuary system which, after 
World War II, would provide the basis for the Delta Plan. 
Its backdrop was the Delta Plan’s predecessor: the first 
major coastal reconstruction and reclamation project of 
the twentieth century, the Zuiderzee Works. 
THE IJSSELMEER AND THE DELTA: A 
NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR FLOOD PROTECTION, 
FARMLAND AND FRESH WATER
THE ZUIDERZEE WORKS
The Zuiderzee project, the largest twentieth-century 
Dutch reclamation project and an icon of modernist 
planning and engineering, has a long history. The first 
nineteenth century plans for this huge undertaking 
had a dual motivation. They focused on an agricultural 
enterprise economically justified by prospects of being 
able to sell the reclaimed land to farmers for a profit. 
However, like many of its predecessors, the Zuiderzee 
project proposals were equally motivated by concerns 
over flooding, as storm surges in the Zuiderzee repeat-
edly caused havoc along its coasts. Nearly every genera-
tion witnessed a major flood disaster. There were partic-
ularly heavy storm surges in the years 1717, 1775, 1776, 
1808, and 1825.16
Subsequent to the Haarlemmermeer’s successful 
drainage, a great number of more-or-less visionary 
plans were put forth for reclaiming what many seemed 
to think was only its somewhat bigger brother, the 
Zuiderzee. However, the fact that the Zuiderzee was a 
maritime bay filled with salt water, subject to tides and 
currents, made the purported “family resemblance” 
rather specious. In fact, the Zuiderzee was in another 
league entirely. 
The first plans that were developed in 1848–49 were 
chiefly advanced by Frisian agricultural interests and 
were designed to drain and reclaim almost the entire 
Zuiderzee (and part of what is now the Waddenzee) by 
extending the reclamation not only along the east coast 
of North Holland but also to the coast of Friesland and 
even a part of the Groningen coast. In 1875, however, 
the Rijkswaterstaat engineer Leemans proposed a more 
modest plan to enclose and reclaim only the southern 
part of the Zuiderzee. This would leave the sea dikes in 
Friesland, North Holland, and Groningen still facing 
open tidal salt water, which would be difficult for 
drainage and virtually useless for irrigation. Worse yet, 
common sense suggested that the enclosing dam would 
raise water levels on its seaward side and place these 
sea-dikes in even greater jeopardy from storm surges. 
In any event, the government fell and the bill pending 
in Parliament was withdrawn. But it was clear, at least to 
166
Two Centuries of Experience in Water Resources Management
Van Diggelen 1849 Leemans 1877
Kooy and Opperdoes Alewijn
1870 - 1873
Lely 1891
0 30 km
Four Zuiderzee Reclamation Plans, 1849–1891
Top left: Van Diggelen’s 1849 plan; top right: Leemans’ 1877 plan; bottom left: Kooy’s and Opperdoes 
Alewijn’s 1870–1873 plan; bottom right: Lely’s 1891 plan. Lely’s plan encompassed the basics of 
the later Zuiderzee Works. Lely designated four polders: (clockwise) Noordoostpolder, Flevoland, 
Markerwaard, and Wieringermeer.
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some, that the interests of the northern provinces would 
be served only by a plan in which the enclosing dam was 
positioned well to the north—hence, the founding of the 
Zuiderzee Association in 1886. 
Initiators of the Zuiderzee Association were Age 
Buma (agricultural consultant, member of the Frisian 
Agricultural Society, member of Parliament) and P. J. G. 
van Diggelen (lawyer in Zwolle and son of civil engineer 
B. P. G. van Diggelen, author of another very ambitious 
1849 plan to enclose the entire Zuiderzee).17 Membership 
in the association was open to provinces, municipalities, 
water boards, and private citizens. It was financed by 
membership dues and donations. Formally, the associa-
tion aimed at the publication of a well-wrought plan, 
based on its own research, for the enclosure and recla-
mation of what they called the “entire” Zuiderzee. 
Neither the civil engineering establishment 
enthroned in the Royal Institute of Engineers nor the 
Rijkswaterstaat were convinced; official opinion held 
that such an ambitious reclamation would be fool-
hardy. The technical feasibility was doubtful and, even 
if it could be done, there would hardly be profit in it. 
So around 1890 the curious situation arose of a private 
association framing an assault on the civil engineering 
establishment (and the Rijkswaterstaat in particular) 
with the aim of advancing a regionally-inspired plan for 
a Zuiderzee reclamation. The assault was facilitated by 
a Parliament based on regional representation, and the 
weapons were hydrological science, meticulous data 
gathering, and economic reasoning—all larded with 
visionary utopianism.
The founding of the Zuiderzee Association and its 
dedication to science and data was basically a response 
to Parliament’s rejection of a plan put forth by Buma in 
1882—using his right of initiative as parliamentarian. 
Buma’s plan was a minor reworking of the already 
discredited “total” approach favored during the early 
years of the liberal revolution, with as its major virtue 
the inclusion of the Frisian and Groningen coast in the 
enclosure scheme. Frustrated by the rejection of the 
plan and the refusal of Parliament and the government 
to subject the question to a proper scientific investiga-
tion, Buma and Van Diggelen considered it time to take 
matters into their own hands by founding the Zuiderzee 
Association and hiring a young Delft-trained engineer 
to undertake the necessary research to produce a robust 
plan based on their particular view of the matter.
By 1891 the young engineer, Cornelis Lely, had 
produced a new plan for the closure and partial recla-
mation of the Zuiderzee, based on four years of inten-
sive research, both in the literature and on board a 
survey vessel in the Zuiderzee itself.18 Thanks to this 
work, Lely had been able to produce a detailed map 
of the sea bottom and he could therefore situate his 
reclamations where the seabed promised to be most 
fertile. The reclamation of the four, later five, indi-
vidual polders was to be preceded (with the exception 
of the first, the Wieringermeer) by construction of the 
main closure dam. The dam would eliminate tides in 
the now-enclosed sea and, because of the influx of 
fresh water from the IJssel river coupled with drainage 
through sluices in the dam at low tide, rapidly turn 
the sea into a freshwater lake. Once this had been 
accomplished, the four remaining ring-dikes could be 
constructed, the water pumped out to form polders, 
and the land prepared for occupation. Lely’s inclusion 
of the mouth of the IJssel River behind the closure dam 
required not only large tidal sluices in the dam but 
also a large buffer lake to store the river’s discharge 
in the event of protracted high river stages or storm 
surges at sea. The large lake was not only hydraulically 
advantageous, it also promised to be an important 
resource for water management (drainage, irriga-
tion, and flood control) in the provinces surrounding 
the proposed reclamation. It was, in short, a system 
for water management—with multipurpose manage-
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ment features—but also a plan that still had too few 
supporters to be taken up in Parliament or to be of 
interest to the Rijkswaterstaat or the ruling govern-
ment. However, inasmuch as Lely had been asked in 
the summer of 1891 to assume the post of minister 
of waterstaat, trade, and industry in the left-liberal 
cabinet headed by Gijsbert van Tienhoven, this state of 
affairs was about to change. His new position enabled 
him to further the Zuiderzee reclamation as a national 
project. Although as minister Lely had many irons 
in the fire (for example, he devoted much energy to 
progressive labor legislation), he did not lose sight of 
his Zuiderzee plans and in 1892 appointed a broad-
based government commission to make recommenda-
tions on how to proceed. The commission’s report of 
April 1894 was overwhelmingly in favor of reclamation 
along the lines of Lely’s 1891 plan; but before matters 
could be put to a vote the government collapsed, and 
the project was shelved. Nonetheless, it was clear there 
was now consensus on a practical plan for partial 
reclamation of the Zuiderzee, though numerous ques-
tions remained about the economic justification and 
the technical feasibility.
By the turn of the century, the plan was firmly fixed 
in the national consciousness and had acquired an 
importance far beyond the regional northern interests 
initially pursued by Buma and the Zuiderzee Associa-
tion. In addition to the “agrarian” improvement of the 
surrounding territories—improved drainage, flood 
protection, and fresh water for irrigation—it had also 
acquired significance as a new framework for safer 
inland navigation as well as providing a route for a much 
shorter railway link to the north via the enclosure dam. 
In 1901, Lely, during a second term as minister, again 
submitted a Zuiderzee bill to Parliament, but again the 
collapse of the government halted progress.
A third attempt was made in 1907 by a new minister 
of waterstaat, trade, and industry, the dynamic Delft 
civil engineering professor Jacob Kraus. Though this 
government was also short-lived, the bill stayed on the 
books until 1913. Meanwhile, details of the project, such 
as the proposed method of building the enclosing dam 
using traditional materials like sand and basalt-ballasted 
willow mattresses came under attack in the popular 
and the engineering press. A number of commenta-
tors—several from outside the engineering establish-
ment—proposed revolutionary new designs using rein-
forced concrete caissons, claiming that construction on 
the basis of the existing plans was hopelessly outdated 
and would be needlessly risky and expensive. However, 
reinforced concrete was far from a proven technology 
for hydraulic works, and in order to settle the matter and 
save the project from public deconstruction of its tech-
nical feasibility, the Zuiderzee Association appointed 
a Reinforced Concrete Commission in 1909. Two years 
later, this commission returned a split decision, with 
the majority underscoring the advantages of using rein-
forced concrete caissons to effect the closure, but an 
important minority stressing the great risks involved. It 
seemed that parliamentary ratification of the pending 
bill was farther away than ever.
Half a decade later, however, events had conspired 
to change the odds again. In 1913 Lely had accepted 
a third term as minister on condition that he be given 
free rein to see a new Zuiderzee bill through Parliament. 
He started his campaign by retracting the pending bill 
and appointing a commission to reassess the economic 
underpinnings of the project—assuming that Parlia-
ment would want to see a profit before it consented to 
invest the money. However, this time nature intervened. 
In January 1916 a severe storm surge caused dikes to be 
breached at several places around the Zuiderzee. The 
entire countryside north of Amsterdam flooded and, 
standing on the city quays along the southern shore of 
the IJ, the inhabitants of the capital were able to see with 
their own eyes the danger of an open Zuiderzee. Lely 
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took advantage of the flood to underscore the impor-
tance of the Zuiderzee project for flood control and 
submitted a new bill to Parliament. 
But the 1891 plan on which the bill was based had 
situated the closure dam such that the northern coasts 
of Friesland and Groningen remained unprotected. 
There were concerns in the north that the new dam 
would, in fact, increase the average height of tides 
along these coasts, and in that way also raise the height 
of storm surges—thus actually increasing the threat of 
flooding. Opinions differed regarding this claim and 
there was no consensus about an appropriate method 
for determining the new dam’s effects on water levels. 
To alleviate the uncertainty and the associated resis-
tance in Parliament, Lely appointed a commission 
in 1918, headed by the Leiden University physicist 
and Nobel Laureate Hendrik Lorentz, to solve the 
controversy on the basis of a mathematical analysis. 
In the course of the next eight years Lorentz and his 
associates took many measurements and devised an 
entirely new method of calculating the propagation of 
tides through systems of estuarial tidal channels, an 
approach that would prove extremely fruitful in years 
to come.19 The commission’s report appeared in 1926 
and predicted a rise of nearly a meter near the point 
where the dam joined the Frisian coast. This predic-
tion corresponded within just a few centimeters to 
actual measurements after the dam was built—an 
outcome that did much to bolster trust in mathematical 
modeling.20 The Lorentz report also indicated that 
the closure dam alignment had to be modified. The 
seafloor in the vicinity of the Frisian coast offered no 
solid foundation for the two complexes of five drainage 
sluices that were projected there, complementing the 
three complexes of five drainage sluices that had been 
designed at the southern tip of the dam. A bend in the 
alignment near the Frisian coast solved this problem. 
This bend also reduced high water levels at this spot. 
Fortunately, Lely did not have to wait for Lorentz’s 
results to proceed with his project. By 1918 critical 
food shortages during the closing months of World 
War I convinced many parliamentarians that food self-
sufficiency was an important national goal and that the 
200,000 hectares of agricultural land promised by the 
Zuiderzee project would go a long way toward meeting 
the country’s needs in this regard. Hence in June 1918, 
even before the end of the war, a concise three-page law 
was passed committing the government to constructing a 
dam across the Zuiderzee between Den Oever and Piaam 
and to reclaiming five polders according to the outlines 
of the plan of 1891. In June 1920 the construction of the 
first section of the dam between the mainland of North 
Holland and the island of Wieringen was undertaken.
As noted above, Lely’s doubts about the flexibility 
and zeal of the Rijkswaterstaat led to his creation of a 
new dedicated organization—the Zuiderzee Service—to 
carry out the works. At the time, the Rijkswaterstaat, as 
Tessel Pollmann puts it, was “bureaucratic, hesitant, 
lethargic, a closed structure of civil-servants, with slug-
gish promotions on the basis of years of service—all this 
made the Rijkswaterstaat unsuited to lead a large, new 
project.”21 Only a few senior Rijkswaterstaat engineers 
made the switch to the Zuiderzee Service; for the rest, 
the Zuiderzee Service had to make do with new recruits. 
It would take until the mid-1930s before the Rijkswa-
terstaat, under Ringer’s inspired leadership, began to 
recover from this blow to its prestige. 
Meanwhile, the fledgling Zuiderzee Service, headed 
by the former Rijkswaterstaat chief engineer Hendrik 
Wortman, shouldered the heavy burden with its distant 
promise of glory. The work of the Zuiderzee Service was 
embedded in a broad-based cross-pillar coalition orga-
nized in the so-called Zuiderzee Council. Lely acted as 
chairman; co-chairmen were Gerard Vissering, presi-
dent of the Dutch State Bank, and the prominent politi-
cian Hendrik Colijn, active in the Zuiderzee Association 
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and later to become minister of finance and finally 
prime minister. The council also included high-placed 
civil servants from agriculture, fisheries, public health, 
water management, defense, economics, and finance. 
The council’s formal task was to review the work of the 
Zuiderzee Service and to offer advice where necessary. 
It also served to anchor the project in the various policy 
domains on which it touched. The Zuiderzee Works had 
become a truly national project.
No sooner had construction started than the postwar 
recession occasioned renewed doubts about the proj-
ect’s economic viability. Fearing vast cost overruns and 
doubtful of the profit to be had, the minister of finance 
appointed a state commission in 1921 to assess the 
economic feasibility of the proposed works. Though the 
project was never completely halted, it was considerably 
delayed before the commission finally gave the go-ahead 
again in 1924, citing in particular the value of new land 
for the “healthy development” of agriculture and the 
importance of a new supply of fresh water.22 It is curious 
that flood defense was no longer the major issue, or at 
least not one that could be evaluated in economic terms. 
In 1925, during his first tour of duty as prime 
minister, Hendrik Colijn submitted a bill to Parliament 
stipulating that the Zuiderzee Works should thence-
forth be carried out with all possible speed. It was 
passed by acclamation. The Zuiderzee Service could 
now proceed rapidly with the difficult task of building 
the main dam. It was materially aided in this endeavor 
by a new form of cooperation among several large 
hydraulic contractors united in the so-called Company 
for the Execution of the Zuiderzee Works. Under the 
effective leadership of Johannes Ringers (who in 1928 
had just completed the North Lock at IJmuiden and 
would return to the Rijks waterstaat as its director-
general only two years later), this well-equipped engi-
neering conglomerate devised new procedures and 
specialized equipment for depositing what is estimated 
Closure dam works: fascine mattresses made of willow branches were used extensively in the 
Zuiderzee closure dam to resist bottom erosion caused by fierce currents, 1929
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to be some 36.5 million cubic meters of sand and till 
(boulder clay) to create the massive body of the dam.23 
The fortuitous discovery of deposits of boulder clay 
in the Zuiderzee itself proved crucial in closing the 
final gaps. Doing so was a race against time, because 
with every change of the tide the fierce currents in 
the breach threatened to wash away what the workers 
and the cranes had just as feverishly deposited in the 
preceding hours. But the boulder clay proved suffi-
ciently resistant and the cranes sufficiently fast to make 
even this part of the task almost routine in the end. The 
great fear was that a sudden storm would wash away 
months of tedious work. Though there were some close 
calls, the project proceeded apace and, on May 28, 
1932, in an impressive ceremony, the final buckets of 
till closed the dam. While dividing the new IJsselmeer 
from the North Sea, at the same time the dam provided 
a means for connecting the provinces of North Holland 
and Friesland via a 32-kilometer-long highway. 
While the dam was still under construction, work 
was also started on the first of five planned polders, the 
so-called Wieringermeerpolder. Because the main closure 
dam was not yet completed, the polder dikes themselves 
had to be built in what was effectively open sea, and the 
builders consequently faced the same issues as on the 
main dam. This was not the case with subsequent polders, 
because their enclosing dikes could be built in tideless 
fresh water already cut off from the open sea by the main 
enclosure dam. With its 207 square kilometers of new 
land, the Wieringermeerpolder was in itself a serious 
agrarian enterprise, but it was also seen as a laboratory 
in which to develop techniques and protocols for making 
and populating the much bigger subsequent polders. To 
start with, the Wieringmeer was drained by two pumping 
The Closure Dam nears completion, 1932
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stations, one powered by diesel engines and the other 
by electric motors, as a purposeful experiment to allow 
a comparison of reliability and operating costs of the 
different techniques under similar conditions. Moreover, 
it was insurance in case one or the other sources of energy 
became scarce or suddenly unavailable. 
In the summer of 1930 the Wieringermeer had 
been pumped out and the land fell dry. Desalinating 
the old seabed and preparing the endless expanse of 
raw clay for human occupation and farming was the 
first order of business, to be accomplished by a sepa-
rate Wieringermeer Directorate that was established 
alongside the Zuiderzee Service in 1930.24 This powerful 
and highly technocratic agency was responsible not 
only for preparing the land in a material sense—plan-
ning and constructing villages and towns, creating 
micro-drainage systems, deep-plowing the soil, and 
building roads, canals, bridges, and locks—but also for 
parceling the land out and distributing it to farmers. 
In an effort to avoid repeating the dismal history of the 
haphazard settling of the Haarlemmermeerpolder in 
the mid-nineteenth century, the new population of the 
Wieringermeerpolder was meticulously selected, not 
only in an effort to achieve a religious balance and to 
ward off potential troublemakers, but also to maximize 
the chances of success by selecting only ambitious and 
vigorous colonists who had already proved themselves 
on the old land. To screen and select the candidates 
according to what could at least be argued were profes-
sional scientific standards, the Wieringermeer Direc-
torate, very much in the spirit of the times, employed 
sociologists and psychologists. In all respects, the Wier-
The final gap in the Closure Dam is being closed, May 28, 1932
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Map of the Noordoostpolder
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ingermeer set the tone for the reclamation and popula-
tion of the subsequent IJsselmeerpolders.
These polders followed after the closure of the 
Zuiderzee in 1932 and by 1936 its transformation into 
the freshwater IJsselmeer. In 1937 work was started on 
the so-called Noordoostpolder (Northeast Polder). The 
ring of dikes was closed by December 1940. In the mean-
time, German forces had invaded the Netherlands and 
established a Nazi regime. However, initially at least, 
the invaders supported the improvement of their new 
province and no attempt was made to interfere with 
the completion of the polder, for example, by rationing 
fuel supplies or building materials. At the beginning 
of 1941 the three pumping stations began their work, 
and by September 1942 the 480 square kilometers (185 
square miles) of polder were pronounced dry, though 
far from habitable or tillable. By this time rationing of 
fuel and material made progress extremely difficult, but 
the construction of micro-drainage and transportation 
infrastructure continued throughout the war. By 1947 
the Wieringermeer Directorate, following the same strict 
selection process as in the Wieringermeerpolder, was 
able to start the process of allocating land to farmers. 
Requirements were relaxed somewhat when priority 
was given to farmers dispossessed as a result of the cata-
strophic 1953 floods in Zeeland.
The Noordoostpolder was a unique enterprise. 
Unlike the Wieringermeerpolder, which was, in some 
sense, a large-scale proof of principle and a laboratory 
for testing out different approaches, the Noordoost-
polder was the real thing, a feeling that was expressed by 
designing it as a kind of celebration of a modernist idea 
of new land. The pattern of settlements was inspired by 
the “central places” approach developed in the 1930s by 
the German geographer Walter Christaller. The original 
plan was to build a central city, Emmeloord, surrounded 
by a ring of smaller towns at distances of one hour by 
bicycle from Emmeloord. After the war the plan was 
modified due to the increased use of automobiles. 
Modernity was also evident in the fact that Emmeloord’s 
several churches, built to serve the various denomina-
tions selected into the polder’s new population, were 
utterly dominated by a single huge tower at the city’s 
center whose secular carillon sounded far and wide over 
the polder. One of the small towns, Nagele, was itself an 
experiment in modern town planning, being designed 
by a collective of modernist architects and town plan-
ners, including famous names like Aldo van Eyck, Gerrit 
Rietveld, and Mien Ruys. Another odd feature of the new 
polder was the partial inclusion of two former islands, 
Urk and Schokland. The former, which housed a thriving 
fishing village of the same name, remained so aloof from 
its new agrarian setting that in a cultural and economic 
sense it long continued to be an island even though 
firmly connected to the new mainland.
One other feature of the Noordoostpolder that 
deserves mention is its hydraulic relationship to the 
contiguous “old land.” Like the Wieringermeer, the 
Noordoostpolder was directly “tacked on” to the old 
land, effectively using the old sea-dikes as part of the 
ring-dike around the new polder. The surface of the new 
polders was some three to four meters below the level 
of the contiguous old land and, as a result, groundwater 
percolated from the old land into the drainage ditches 
of the new polder. In the case of the Noordoostpolder, 
this phenomenon resulted in progressive desiccation 
and subsidence of the old land between the towns of 
Lemmer and Blokzijl—and a lot of extra pumping in the 
new polder. This design flaw was avoided in subsequent 
polders, all of which were separated from the contiguous 
old land by narrow “peripheral lakes” that conserved 
existing water levels—and hydraulic counterpressure—
on the outer flanks of the old sea-dikes. To this day, 
proposals are regularly put forth to repair the past and 
construct a similar peripheral lake at the boundary of 
the Noordoostpolder and the old land. 
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Stone-pitching in the dike surrounding Eastern Flevoland
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While the Noordoostpolder was still being finished 
and populated, in 1950, work had already started on 
the next polder, Eastern Flevoland. By 1957 it was 
pronounced dry and ready for further development. 
Slightly larger than the Noordoostpolder, its design 
was, in many ways, the product of a new age. It was 
dominated by a new city, Lelystad, on its westernmost 
corner. Lelystad’s placement near the geographical 
center of the new IJsselmeer polders clinched its 
destiny as both economic hub and capital city. 
However, because the last of the planned polders has 
not (yet) been built, the economic promise of Lelystad 
has not been fully realized. Lelystad was the first Dutch 
city to be designed in full consciousness of the impact 
of automobiles on urban space, following the prin-
ciples of the famous Buchanan report (Traffic in Towns) 
published in 1963. The basic message was that in order 
to maintain a livable urban environment, car traffic 
should be isolated as much as possible from other 
transport systems and urban functions in general. In 
Lelystad this was realized by designing the city at two 
levels, one for automobiles and one for other functions. 
Opinion is divided whether this has in fact produced a 
more “livable” city. The advent of the automobile also 
legitimized reducing the number of peripheral towns. It 
also subtly redefined Eastern Flevoland as a road trans-
port hub, inasmuch as it lay at the crossroads of new 
east-west and north-south road links—the latter across 
the dike built from Lelystad to Enkhuizen in antici-
pation of the fifth unbuilt polder, the Markerwaard. 
However, besides its usefulness as roadbed, this dike 
also had an important hydraulic function, connected 
with the appropriation of the new IJsselmeer into a 
national fresh water system.
TOWARD A NATIONAL FRESHWATER SYSTEM
In addition to creating new land, the closure of the 
Zuiderzee also created an enormous new freshwater 
basin in the heart of the country. The Zuiderzee was, 
strictly speaking, an estuary of the IJssel river, itself a 
distributary of the Rhine. Hence, the Zuiderzee had 
always been the recipient of generous amounts of fresh 
Rhine water. Precipitation, runoff, and a number of 
smaller rivers also contributed to the inflow of fresh 
water and reduced the Zuiderzee’s intrinsic salinity. After 
closure, the huge sluices in the new dam released excess 
water at every low tide and hence the IJssel Lake’s salinity 
was progressively reduced. It was only a matter of time 
before it would be fresh enough to be incorporated into 
the hydraulic systems of the surrounding countryside 
(as drainage buffer and source of water for irrigation and 
flushing) and even possibly as a source of potable water.
By 1936 the IJsselmeer was declared nominally 
fresh. The declaration occurred at a moment in time 
when issues of water quality, and particularly the 
increasing scarcity of non-polluted (and non-saline) 
sources for public water supplies, were being hotly 
debated. Basically there were two issues: first, increasing 
salinity and, second, increasing pollution due to munic-
ipal sewerage and industrial wastes. Both were byprod-
ucts of population increase and industrialization. 
Salt intrusions occurred via groundwater as 
deeper layers of salt water replaced the potable fresh 
water pumped up from aquifers, especially the coastal 
dunes. This effect had been known since the turn of 
the century.25 Increasing salinity of surface water was 
mostly due to the continual enlargement of seaways, 
particularly the New Waterway in Rotterdam. Every 
high tide conveyed tons of marine salts up the rivers; 
every increase in waterway dimensions exacerbated this 
problem. The increasing salinity was most critical for 
the greenhouse industry along the northern shore of the 
New Waterway, inasmuch as these farmers were depen-
dent on its waters for irrigation of their greenhouse crops 
(which, of course, did not get rinsed from time to time 
by natural precipitation). Predictions indicated that it 
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would only be a matter of time before the so-called “salt 
tongue” would also threaten the intakes of public water 
supplies farther upstream. These were, in fact, already 
threatened by a second front in the “salt war”—the 
increasing salinity of Rhine water caused by effluents 
primarily from Alsatian potash mines and coal mines 
and steel plants in the Ruhr.26
Pollution of ground and surface water by sewage 
and industrial effluents was also an issue that had been 
around since the turn of the century. But whereas at 
the outset water pollution had been a local and inci-
dental affair, by the 1930s it was taking on systemic 
proportions. Sewage from the larger cities was increas-
ingly compromising the water supplies of neighboring 
Eastern Flevoland
R
ij
ks
w
a
te
rs
ta
a
t
178
Two Centuries of Experience in Water Resources Management
municipalities. Rotterdam and other cities on tidal 
rivers were even threatening their riverine water intakes 
with their own pollution. Add to this the increasing 
burden of a wide range of industrial pollutants, both 
of Dutch origin and imported by the Rhine and Meuse 
rivers from industries in the Ruhr and the Liège basin, 
and it becomes clear why a mood of crisis and gloom 
dominated Dutch discussions on fresh water in the 
1930s and why the creation of the IJsselmeer was 
greeted with such enthusiasm.
In 1933, even before the lake had formally been 
pronounced fresh, Johan M. K. Pennink, eminent 
hydrologist and the first director of Amsterdam’s water-
works after it became a public utility, warned: “Let us 
now finally and unreservedly acknowledge that we 
have gotten ourselves into a difficult pass, from which 
we can escape only by creating a preferably large and 
truly freshwater lake. That is not as easy as many may 
think.”27 Pennink’s “difficult pass” was the dire prospect 
of insufficient fresh water for Dutch public waterworks, 
particularly in the highly urbanized west.28 Though the 
large freshwater lake might solve the problem, making it 
fresh and, especially, keeping it so depended on holding 
the lake’s salinity to extremely low levels. A major source 
of salts, as Pennink argued in his article, would certainly 
be the new polders. The soil was still saturated with chlo-
rides which would slowly leach out and be pumped into 
the lake in the process of routine drainage. 
Pennink’s polemic against further land reclamation 
put the Zuiderzee Service in a tight spot, the more so as 
it not only pursued reclamation but also subscribed to 
the idea of an IJsselmeer as a source of potable water. 
As soon as the dam was closed in 1932, the Zuiderzee 
Service began to study the behavior of its new charge, 
paying attention not only to the inflow and outflow of 
water, but also keeping track of various contributors 
to the lake’s salt burden. It soon became clear that, 
although great quantities of salt were leached from the 
new polders (and indeed the entire salt-impregnated 
former sea bottom), the inflow of fresh water from the 
IJssel (along with the expulsion of water through the 
sluices in the dam) would just suffice to reduce salinity 
to tolerable levels within a span of several years—even 
though the IJssel itself was burdened with Rhine salt. In 
other words, the most favorable outcome depended on 
maximizing IJssel River input into the IJsselmeer.
At this juncture the Rijkswaterstaat, in pursuit of its 
responsibility to maintain and improve the nation’s navi-
gable waterways, came up with a plan that threatened to 
wreck the delicate win-win solution that the Zuiderzee 
Service had in mind. The crux was ensuring the nautical 
accessibility of the new Twente Canal system. The 
original plan prescribed a direct link from Twente to the 
Waal (the main Dutch Rhine branch), but the canal as 
built connected to the Rhine only via the upper reaches 
of the IJssel, between Zutphen and Arnhem. The upper 
IJssel was, however, poorly navigable, and in order to 
realize the full potential of the new Twente Canals, the 
Rijkswaterstaat proposed to canalize this stretch of the 
river. This plan, though it would hardly affect the IJssel’s 
flow at high river stages, would certainly cause stagna-
tion at low summer stages—precisely when maximum 
inflow to the IJsselmeer was most needed to combat 
salinity. Rijkswaterstaat also favored the IJssel canaliza-
tion because it could contribute to the desalinization 
of the western part of the country. Canalizing the IJssel 
would produce higher average river stages at Arnhem, 
which would force more fresh water through the Nether-
Rhine-Lek-New Waterway system and help to keep the 
New Waterway’s encroaching salt-tongue at bay.
It was obvious at this stage (the late 1930s) that the 
broad coalition of interests in keeping the IJsselmeer as 
fresh as possible was on a direct collision course with 
the equally valid interest in keeping salt water out of the 
urbanized west. This might well have led to much acri-
mony and fatal delay had it not been for a rejuvenated 
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Rijkswaterstaat that was prepared to assume the role 
of national system builder by effectively integrating the 
IJsselmeer into a national system for distributing the 
Rhine’s supply of fresh water throughout the nation.
The key to this national hydraulic system were the 
plans that Johan van Veen and his colleagues at the 
Research Service for the Tidal Rivers had been framing 
since 1936 in response to complaints about saliniza-
tion. Based on new insights into the propagation of 
tidal flows, Van Veen had devised a scheme to conjoin a 
number of large islands and close off the seaward ends 
of a major estuary (the Brielse Maas) just south of the 
New Waterway. This scheme, which after World War II 
was developed into the “Five Island Plan” and ultimately 
the Delta Works, would reduce the amount of salt water 
entering the river system at each high tide—and espe-
cially at storm surges. Not only was high water deflected 
at the seaward entrance to the Brielse Maas, it was also 
kept at bay via the “back door” thanks to a reduction 
in the surface area of the basin that had to be “filled.” A 
second advantage was that more fresh river water from 
the Lek would be forced northward through the New 
Waterway, precisely where it was most needed.
But it took the keen vision of the new director-
general of the Rijkswaterstaat, Ludolf Reinier Wentholt, 
to fuse these disparate projects—the IJsselmeer and 
Van Veen’s “island plan”—into the backbone of what 
he was soon calling the “national water household.”29 
In November 1940 Wentholt wrote a memo describing 
twenty different features of this “water household,” 
which in its emphasis on the interlocked nature of quan-
titative and qualitative aspects of water management 
actually foreshadowed what would become “integral 
water management” a half century later. In one breath 
Wentholt named such previously separate aspects as 
“the feeding of canals, the pollution of public waters, the 
salinization of the western and northern Netherlands, 
and the public water supplies of various large cities.”30 
During World War II, the German occupiers 
allowed routine water management to go on largely 
undisturbed. It seems there was even an opportunity 
to plan for the future, because in the course of 1940–41 
Wentholt succeeded in forging a new consensus 
between the freshwater demands of the west and those 
of the north (the IJsselmeer). Consultations with key 
advisors like Jo Thijsse, director of the Hydraulic Lab 
at Delft, chief engineer Victor Jean Pierre de Blocq 
van Kuffeler of the Zuiderzee Service, and (of course) 
Johan van Veen revealed that the latter’s “island plan” 
would be so effective in resisting the salt-intrusions 
in the estuaries that it would be possible to canalize 
the Nether-Rhine rather than the IJssel. Canalizing the 
Nether-Rhine would have the effect of driving more 
water up the IJssel even at low Rhine stages, because 
the first weir in the Nether-Rhine (at Driel) could be set 
to raise water levels at the upstream junction of the two 
rivers. This would provide enough draught in the IJssel 
for navigation as well as keeping fresh water flowing 
into the IJsselmeer. Although the Nether-Rhine would 
convey almost no water at low Rhine stages, it would 
remain navigable thanks to the closed weirs and locks. 
Thus, in addition to the weir complex at Driel, similar 
complexes along the Nether-Rhine were designed at 
Amerongen and Hagestein. The designs were devel-
oped by L. van Bendegom, who created a so-called 
visor weir, named after the visor of a medieval helmet. 
The purely tensile water forces on the two semi-circular 
visors were transferred to hinges in the land abutment 
and the central pier. The construction elements were 
deemed indispensable in order to resist wind forces 
when the visor was opened. The circular shape induces 
the underflowing water to spread over a larger width 
than the navigation opening, thus reducing the neces-
sary amount of bottom protection. In addition, the 
visor shape produces a variable underflow opening, 
damping vibrations produced by the undercurrents.
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Nether-Rhine canalization system: at low Rhine stages, the Driel weir is closed to 
ensure fresh water flow to the IJsselmeer through the IJssel (upward arrow)
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The Nether-Rhine canalization was carried out 
between 1954 and 1970. With the completion of the 
Haringvliet Sluices in 1971 as part of the Delta Plan, 
Wentholt’s vision of a national water household was 
finally realized. However, while concerns about salini-
zation were incorporated into the design of the Delta 
Plan, the broader issues of pollution and ecological 
sustainability that Wentholt had started to address were 
drowned out by the call for secure flood defenses in the 
aftermath of the catastrophic flood of February 1953. It 
would take many years—until the cultural revolution of 
the 1960s and 1970s—before water quality in the broad 
sense would become a prominent issue again. 
THE HIGH TIDE OF COASTAL ENGINEERING
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
In the 1930s and 1940s, the Research Service for the 
Tidal Rivers, under the energetic leadership of Johan van 
Veen, made pioneering contributions to the rather unex-
plored field of coastal engineering. The main topics were 
tidal modeling—inspired by the Lorentz Committee—
wave research, morphology, sediment transport, and 
estuary research. Van Veen himself did extensive 
research into tidal currents, the coastal morphology, 
and sediment transport in the English Channel and 
the North Sea. The Research Service thus gave a major 
impetus to the emergence of science-based coastal 
Weir at Hagestein, regulating the water level in the Nether Rhine during 
low stages to facilitate navigation, completed in 1958
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engineering, a multidisciplinary field integrating fluid 
mechanics, hydrodynamics, tidal and wave research, 
morphology, and meteorology. It was the Dutch version 
of similar American, British, German, and Norwegian 
research programs. In 1939 the first international coastal 
engineering congress took place.31 
Between 1938 and 1953 Van Veen proposed bold 
projects to close off several estuaries in order to address 
both the vulnerability of flood-prone Zeeland and the 
problem of salt intrusion. A closed and therefore short-
ened coastline would decrease the chance of dike failure 
and create new freshwater reservoirs. He also set up a dike 
monitoring program in southwestern Holland, because 
he was worried about rising sea levels in the future. The 
results were alarming, showing that the dikes were grossly 
inadequate to provide a sufficient level of safety. 
The government responded by appointing a Storm 
Surge Committee in 1939, which expanded the moni-
toring program, made predictions about future storm 
surge levels and developed new sea dike design stan-
dards.32 Van Veen’s colleague, Pieter Wemelsfelder, 
proposed a new flood management philosophy in 1939 
based on a probabilistic rather than experiential assess-
ment of storm surge heights and frequencies. Prior to 
this, the design heights for dikes were based on the 
highest recorded water level, plus some margin of safety. 
Wemelsfelder refused to take experience for granted, 
in particular the notion that the highest recorded water 
level was also the highest possible water level. On the 
basis of a very long time frame, spanning 10,000 years, 
he was able to estimate the statistical probability of 
various extreme high water levels. He concluded that 
there was a reasonable chance that the highest recorded 
water level would be surpassed within a century. 
Wemelsfelder’s storm surge frequency distribution 
method was adopted by the Storm Surge Committee 
to predict future storm surge heights as a baseline for 
design standards for coastal and estuarial dikes.
WALCHEREN
In the immediate postwar years, the exciting advances in 
coastal knowledge, the emerging flood risk philosophy, 
and the development of new coastal strategies and 
designs, went hand in hand with the mastery of new 
technical skills. These skills were first honed during the 
recovery of the Island of Walcheren in the province of 
Zeeland in 1945, the final year of the war. Walcheren had 
been intentionally flooded by Allied Forces the previous 
year in order to drive out the German garrison guarding 
access to the strategically important harbor of Antwerp. 
The flooding had been accomplished by bombing the 
dikes at three widely separated locations. After initial 
hesitation whether it would actually be possible—or 
worth it—to reclaim the island, Queen Wilhelmina’s 
insistence that no territory must be lost to the sea forced 
the issue. The Rijkswaterstaat, in cooperation with the 
MUZ (the contractors’ combination for the Zuiderzee 
Works) rose to the challenge by executing a spectacular 
closure and drainage scheme. The main obstacles were 
the immense depth that the dike breaches had attained 
due to the year-long scouring of tidal currents through the 
gaps—the continuing twice-daily filling and emptying of 
the island through the gaps as a result of the five-meter 
tidal range. The Rijkswaterstaat took a gamble by opting 
to close the breaches with caissons left over from the 
Allied landing operation in Normandy. It turned out that 
sinking caissons in the deep breaches was a very effective 
closing technique, which was perfected in the following 
years. Between 1950 and 1952 two complex closure proj-
ects were performed, the Brielse Maas and the Braakman 
Inlet on the Westerschelde. In planning these opera-
tions, the critical timing and positioning of the caissons 
was crucial, and on this point the assistance of the Delft 
Hydraulics Laboratory proved invaluable, as it had earlier 
in connection with the Walcheren closures. A fruitful and 
long-lasting relationship was built up between hydraulic 
experts and the Rijkswaterstaat engineers.33
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THE 1953 FLOOD DISASTER AND ITS AFTERMATH
In hindsight, these complicated closure projects, 
executed between 1945 and 1952, proved to be 
rehearsals for the reconstruction work after the 1953 
flood and ultimately for the Delta Works. On February 
1, 1953, a mammoth storm surge proved too much 
for the weak dikes in the southwestern delta region, 
breaching them at hundreds of places. A total of 1,836 
people lost their lives; countless cattle drowned in the 
icy water; 500 kilometers of dikes were destroyed; 47,000 
houses, schools, churches, farms, and other buildings 
were damaged. The physical damage was enormous, 
amounting to 1.5 billion guilders (1953 value). And the 
number of casualties could have been much larger: 
On the night of the storm surge, near the village of 
Nieuwer kerk aan de IJssel, a bargeman maneuvered his 
ship in front of an impending dike breach in the Hoge 
Schielandse Zeedijk, a levee protecting Holland’s heart-
land—including the cities of Rotterdam, The Hague, 
and Amsterdam. This action may well have prevented 
the inundation of central Holland, and thus saved thou-
sands of lives, as well as the huge economic assets of the 
nation’s economic core region.
A detailed analysis demonstrated that the catastrophe 
was attributable to a complex of factors. The southwestern 
region had a long coastline, lacking the natural protection 
of dunes, except at the western coast of Goeree, Schou-
wen-Duiveland, and Walcheren. As noted above, poor 
A caisson is being placed to close the last major gap on Walcheren, 1945
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maintenance had seriously weakened the sea dikes. The 
storm surge had struck with exceptional power, because 
of a combination of high winds (11 Beaufort, or 56–63 
knots), blowing across a 1,000-kilometer-long wind-field 
from a north-northwestern direction, stretching from 
Scotland to the Dutch coast. To make matters worse, 
this all coincided with a spring tide. The water level rose 
to three meters above average high tide, a level that 
according to Wemelsfelder’s probabilistic method would 
be expected only once in 300 years. In fact, three consecu-
tive storm surges occurred, and the third one, on the 
afternoon of February 1, dealt the fatal blow. Wind speeds 
were actually not that exceptional, but the gale lasted, at 
least in Zeeland, an extraordinarily long time.34
As the scope of the disaster became clearer, one over-
riding conclusion was drawn: the existing flood defense 
strategy was bankrupt. Investments in sea dike mainte-
nance by the small and poorly funded water boards had 
been utterly inadequate. The storm surge warning system, 
built up since 1921 and managed by the Dutch weather 
institute, the Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Insti-
tuut (KNMI), and the Rijkswaterstaat, had failed, as had 
lines of communication (telephone lines, telegrams) and 
local government. The failure of communications was 
especially serious, inasmuch as the mobilization of emer-
gency dike monitoring teams depended on functioning 
communications. Weather forecasts had been broadcast 
by radio, but they had underestimated the gravity of the 
The flooded village of Nieuwerkerk, Zeeland, February 1953 
A
v
io
d
ro
m
e 
L
u
ch
tf
o
to
g
ra
fi
e,
 L
el
ys
ta
d
6   The Emergence of a National Hydraulic Technocracy
185
approaching storm surge. Thus, the Rijkswaterstaat and 
other authorities in the region were caught utterly by 
surprise as the dikes broke and the water flowed in. 
A long and heated discussion ensued between the 
Rijkswaterstaat and the KNMI about these communica-
tion failures and the measures to be taken in the future. 
In 1954 the dialogue resulted in a new set of rules. Storm 
surge warning messages were to be issued by the respon-
sible Rijkswaterstaat manager instead of the KNMI top 
executive manager. The Rijkswaterstaat issued warning 
messages if a high-water level was expected that occurred 
on average one or two times a year. This was the signal for 
restricted dike monitoring. Once the water had risen to a 
level with a statistical probability of once in ten years, then 
the regional Rijkswaterstaat managers were instructed 
to call up teams for dike monitoring, covering complete 
dike stretches. Moreover, hospitals and other emergency 
services were called into standby mode. Provincial 
authorities retained their own authority in regard to acti-
vating their staff. This storm surge warning system was 
soon extended to cover nearly the entire Dutch coast.35 
In hindsight, it seems amazing that there was almost 
no discussion about the question of whether the disaster 
could have been prevented. Dutch Parliament exhibited 
little interest in initiating official investigations into this 
painful question. The lack of political will to reflect criti-
cally on the multiple failures involved in the flood illus-
trates the widespread tendency to absolve and protect 
the responsible authorities. This was also discernible in 
the weeks after the flood within the provincial adminis-
trations of Zuid-Holland and Zeeland and at meetings 
of the managers of local water boards. A parliamentary 
investigation would raise too much criticism, encroach 
on the authority of the water management actors and, 
by implication, the government, and thus hamper the 
reconstruction of Dutch society—which had top priority.
There are rational arguments against the view 
that the 1953 catastrophe could have been prevented. 
Clearly, postwar dike strengthening schemes had been 
hampered by inadequate funding. Though some proj-
ects, like a major dike through Rotterdam (the Maas-
boulevard) had been completed, the overwhelming 
majority of the dikes remained much too weak. Van 
Veen’s and Wemelsfelder’s new analyses clearly pointed 
out the very serious safety gap in the southwestern parts 
of the country. But although this diagnosis seemed 
convincing to the innovative vanguard, and had an 
unambiguous impact on the Storm Surge Committee’s 
recommendations, the latter—which eventually proved 
to be correct—were also viewed with skepticism, even 
suspicion, by mainstream engineers both in the Rijks-
waterstaat and on the water boards. A second objection 
related to the time scale: planning and implementing 
the huge Delta Works would have required a time span 
of at least twenty years (actually, the Delta Works took 
more than thirty years). Finally, the war would have 
made implementation of such ambitious projects 
impossible, and during the post-war reconstruction, as 
already noted, flood management had to compete in the 
political arena with numerous other urgent matters.36
RECOVERY OPERATIONS
The recovery operations in the wake of the flood 
disaster, beginning with closing the breaches and 
draining the land, were conducted entirely in the spirit 
of the postwar era. It was a time of doing and alertness, 
rather than reflecting—phrases like “can do,” forward-
looking, hands-on typified the mood. This was mani-
fest, first, in the immediate recovery operations. The 
Rijkswaterstaat erected an emergency service (Dienst 
Dijkherstel Zeeland, DDZ) to coordinate the workflow. 
The water boards were completely outmaneuvered—an 
unambiguous indication of their weakened position. 
Until then, their prerogatives and obligations had 
been carefully respected. No fewer than four hundred 
breaches had to be closed, and the pace of work was 
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feverish. The experience gained in the Walcheren 
drainage was invaluable in closing the numerous dike 
breaches, each of which presented a unique challenge. 
Helped by the Hydraulic Laboratory to achieve the 
optimal positioning for sinking, workers sunk numerous 
caissons to close the major breaches. Around midnight 
on November 6 and 7, 1953, at the turn of the tide, the 
last gap, at Ouwerkerk, was closed. The entire operation 
had taken less than a year.
DELTA COMMITTEE
Meanwhile, the government had assembled a Delta 
Committee to develop a strategic vision aimed at 
preventing future floods. The committee was headed by 
the Rijkswaterstaat’s top manager, A. G. Maris, and was 
filled with experts from Rijkswaterstaat, The Delft Poly-
technical University, the Delft Hydraulics Laboratory, 
the Rotterdam Economic University, provinces, water 
boards, consultants, and contractors. Van Veen func-
tioned as secretary. The Delta Committee developed a 
Delta Works scheme, publishing five draft reports and a 
final report in six volumes.37 
In the second report, the committee provided a 
detailed analysis of the situation along the Hollandse 
IJssel, which had narrowly escaped disaster. A Rijks-
waterstaat report emphasized the imminent danger: if 
levees broke here, the lives of 1.5 million citizens were 
jeopardized. In the same vein, the committee was very 
concerned about the low safety level in this region. 
However, instead of a levee-strengthening scheme, it 
proposed to build a storm surge barrier in the Hollandse 
IJssel. The latter option would be less expensive, require 
a shorter construction schedule, occasion less damage 
to the landscape, and simultaneously provide a new 
river bridge. To minimize obstacles to navigation, the 
barrier would be movable.38
The Delta Committee, meanwhile, issued its 
third draft report on February 27, 1954, outlining the 
key elements of the proposed Delta plan. Its main 
components were a seaward closure of the estuaries 
Haringvliet, Brouwershavense Gat, Eastern Scheldt, and 
Veerse Gat, with secondary closure dams behind these 
primary closure dams further inland in the Volkerak, 
Grevelingen, and Zandkreek. The purpose of the 
secondary dams, which would be built first in relatively 
sheltered waters, was to attenuate the tidal currents in 
the estuaries, thus easing the construction of the primary 
seaward dams. They also created new lakes between the 
dams, which were intended as freshwater reservoirs. 
The committee argued that the alternative, a 
comprehensive coastal dike strengthening scheme 
aiming at dike crests at least 1.5 to 2 meters higher, 
would meet with insurmountable problems. Closure 
dams, by contrast, would reduce the length of the coastal 
dikes from 700 kilometers to only 20 to 30 kilometers. 
The current dikes would lose their primary protective 
function, but they would still have a useful function as 
secondary flood protection lines. Coastal maintenance 
management would be much less fragmented, because 
this task was to be transferred from the water boards to 
the Rijkswaterstaat. Obviously, this meant that the water 
boards in the region would suffer a loss of responsibili-
ties, but they would remain in charge of the interior 
dikes as well as polder level (and much later, water 
quality) management. This was not a situation without 
precedent. The closure of the Zuiderzee had effected 
much the same transfer of power and responsibilities 
from water boards to the Rijkswaterstaat.
The committee estimated that the Delta Works 
scheme would cost between 1.5 to 2 billion guilders 
and take some twenty-five years to complete. It further 
devoted much attention to the economic position 
of fisheries and the shellfish industry in the Eastern 
Scheldt. Closure of this estuary meant an annihilation of 
the oyster cultivation, and the mussel cultivation would 
be reduced considerably; consequently, 900 jobs were 
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at stake. Rescue or compensation plans, the committee 
concluded, would certainly be appropriate. 
On January 5, 1955, the fourth draft report was 
made public. It contained more detailed proposals to 
close off the Zandkreek and the Veerse Gat, the so-called 
Three Islands Plan, thus linking Noord-Beveland with 
Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland. To facilitate naviga-
tion, the inland Zandkreekdam was to be provided with 
a lock. The fifth and last draft report developed a new 
flood-safety strategy. The design of sea dikes would have 
to be based on Wemelsfelder’s probabilistic approach. 
The committee proposed three safety levels. Central-
Holland’s sea defense should be able to withstand a storm 
surge level associated with a probability of once in 10,000 
years, the southwestern flood defense structures had to 
meet a safety level of 1:4,000 and most Wadden Island 
dunes and dikes had to maintain a safety level of 1:2,000. 
The corresponding water levels are called “basic levels,” 
from which “design levels” are derived, resulting in a set 
of differentiated safety standards, dependent on differ-
ences in values to be protected, differences in evacuation 
opportunities, and so on. For central Holland, the design 
levels are equal to the basic level (annual exceedance 
frequency of 1:10,000). These safety levels were the result 
of an econometric cost-benefit analysis, balancing the 
investments in flood projects and the flood damage costs. 
The econometric optimal safety level for central Holland 
was determined at 8 x 106 or 1/125,000 per year; a major 
flood in this core economic region would cause unprece-
dented damage. However, this cost-benefit analysis had a 
number of uncertainties, and the committee decided that 
designing for a maximum sea level at Hoek van Holland 
(at the entrance of the New Waterway) of 5 meters above 
mean sea level would give sufficient protection against 
flooding. This was 1.5 meters higher than the highest 
water level during the extreme conditions in 1953. Finally, 
the committee indicated an execution sequence: first the 
moveable storm surge barrier in the Hollandse IJssel, then 
the execution of the Three Islands Plan, followed by the 
closure of the Grevelingen, Volkerak, Haringvliet, Brouw-
erhavense Gat, and Eastern Scheldt.39 
The committee’s high productivity and the speed 
with which it finished its job was remarkable given the 
complexity of its task. Dutch historians have explained 
this amazing efficiency and effectiveness by reference 
to the prior pioneering designs made by Van Veen 
between 1938 and 1953 and to his fundamental tidal, 
geomorphologic, and dike monitoring research. There 
is little doubt that Van Veen’s investigations and plans 
were indeed an important contribution to the final Delta 
Works scheme. However, credit is also due to a later 
generation that made a number of modifications to his 
proposals and added important new elements. Only 
Van Veen’s Hollandse IJssel barrier plan and his Three 
Islands plan were adopted without major adaptations. 
In the end, the Delta Committee’s alacrity seems to have 
owed as much to its own sense of urgency and dedica-
tion to preventing a recurrence of the terrible events of 
1953 as it did to Van Veen’s rich legacy.
The government agreed to the proposals and codi-
fied them in a Delta Act to submit to Parliament. The 
safety standards enshrined in the Delta Act not only 
implied heavy and long-term national investments in 
dike strengthening, they also had a clear impact on the 
balance of power among actors in the field of water 
management, as these norms were also imposed on the 
water boards, thus encroaching on their autonomy. 
After the 1953 flood, the new safety standards 
1:10,000 for the sea dikes in central Holland and 
1:4,000 at the Zeeland coast required massive dike 
strengthening schemes in which the water boards were 
compelled to play their part. A total dike length of thou-
sands of kilometers thus had to be made much more 
robust. Sea dike strengthening projects took several 
decades but made steady progress. It was not long 
before similar probabilistic demands were being applied 
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to the levees along the large rivers. In 1956 Minister of 
Waterstaat Jacob Algera advised the Provincial Estates 
of Gelderland to specify the maximum river discharge 
of the Rhine at Lobith at 18,000 cubic meters per second 
with a probability of 1:3,000 years. This decision was 
taken.40 The water levels along these related rivers were 
defined as the “design high water levels” (maatgevende 
hoogwaterstanden or MHW).
EXECUTION OF THE DELTA WORKS SCHEME
The Rijkswaterstaat set up a new department, the Delta 
Service (Deltadienst), to oversee the realization of the 
Delta Works, beginning with the building of the storm 
surge barrier in the Hollandse IJssel between 1954 and 
1958. The closure projects in the estuaries were carried 
out in order of increasing complexity. Each project was an 
object lesson for the subsequent projects. To gather expe-
rience with the risky and difficult closure technique, the 
smallest seaways were closed first. In accordance with the 
Delta Committee’s recommendations, secondary dams 
were constructed inland of the seaward closure dams 
to attenuate the strong currents invoked by the closure 
operations. A number of closure techniques were applied. 
Caissons, already successfully used to close dike gaps after 
the war and after the 1953 flood, were now further devel-
oped. Various caisson types were custom made to suit 
conditions in the different estuaries. The Delft Hydraulics 
Laboratory again assisted with detailed closure schemes. 
Delft Hydraulics Laboratory model of the southwestern delta, 1948–1956. This model has been used to 
simulate and predict tidal effects and water level changes during the construction of the Delta works. 
The Delft model was inspired by the lower Mississippi River model by WES in Vicksburg.
R
ij
ks
w
a
te
rs
ta
a
t
190
Two Centuries of Experience in Water Resources Management
The Delta Service was worried that at several loca-
tions, such as the Brouwershavense Gat, the estuary 
bed was too unstable to bear the weight of caissons 
without the risk of uncontrolled settling. As an alterna-
tive, the engineers appropriated an alpine technology 
and used a cable-car system spanning the estuary 
equipped with special gondolas that enabled them to 
dump boulders along the entire length of the cable. The 
Rijkswaterstaat had studied this technique in Grenoble 
at the French enterprise Neyrpic, which had ample 
experience with this technology. The Haringvliet, the 
Grevelingen, and the southern part of the Brouwer-
shavense Gat were closed with rock fill, 
dumped by means of such cable lines, 
which were progressively improved.41 
Between 1954 and 1971, the Delta 
Works advanced on schedule with no signif-
icant delays or interruptions. Sometimes 
consultants and contractors co-designed 
elements of the hydraulic structures. For 
the Haringvliet Dam, the Rijkswaterstaat 
established a public-private project team 
to maximize the number of options and 
carefully select the best one. Two of the 
risk factors that designers had to consider 
were the possible damage to the discharge 
sluices caused by ice jams and the wave 
pressure the dam had to withstand. To deal 
with these issues, a hydraulic contractor, 
an engineering consultancy firm, the Delft 
Hydraulics Laboratory, and three Rijks-
waterstaat services were involved in the 
design of the dam construction. After long 
discussions, the Rijkswaterstaat decided 
to construct seventeen discharge sluices 
in the dam, the segment (Tainter) gates of 
which were hinged to a single monolithic 
prestressed concrete beam of triangular 
cross-section. These discharge sluices were big enough 
to discharge Meuse and Rhine river water into the sea, 
even at extraordinarily high river stages. 
In other Delta projects, however, the Delta Service 
had the leading role in design, aided by other tech-
nical Rijkswaterstaat services. Despite chronic fric-
tion between the Rijkswaterstaat services, the projects 
advanced on schedule and the Rijkswaterstaat’s prestige 
rose to an all-time high. The Delta Works were hailed as 
icons of modern engineering.42 Each successive closure 
drew broad media attention and was an occasion for 
widespread flag-waving. 
Gondola dumps rock-fill to build the Grevelingen dam, 1963
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But there was a hidden subplot within this glit-
tering success story. Environmentalism was emerging 
as a popular movement and would soon challenge the 
primacy of flood protection, which was the principle 
focus of the Delta Works. The Rijkswaterstaat itself 
experienced serious harmful environmental effects 
after the Brouwersdam had been completed in 1971. 
The healthy and rich ecosystem in the closed-off Greve-
lingen was destroyed at an incredible pace. Alarmed by 
this ecological disaster, the minister of water manage-
ment, Tjerk Westerterp, decided in 1974 to have a 
sluice constructed in the Brouwersdam, which became 
functional in 1978. Since then, the salt-water ecosystem 
of the Grevelingen lake has recovered. 
Meanwhile, environmentalism was having a huge 
impact on the last closure project. In 1967 the Delta 
Service began to pump sand for three work islands in 
preparation for the extremely difficult estuary closure of 
the Eastern Scheldt. This mighty estuary had, by far, the 
largest tidal volumes—ten times that of the Veerse Gat, 
One of the segment gates in the Haringvliet Dam, completed in 1971
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one of the earliest closures. Thus, closure of this estuary 
was the final pièce de résistance. To reduce the closure 
risks, the Delta Service again opted for a cable trolley 
with boulder-carrying gondolas. By 1970 the cable 
trolley was in place and the Rijkswaterstaat was poised 
to display its mastery of the estuaries in yet another 
complicated closure operation.
However, the Eastern Scheldt closure ran into 
heavy opposition in Parliament. Critics of the closure 
pointed to the damage that would be done to the estu-
ary’s extremely rich aquatic biodiversity and its unique 
variety of bird species. Excellent conditions for mussels 
and oysters supported a flourishing shellfish industry 
of considerable economic importance, which also was 
threatened by the closure plans. The Delta Committee 
had pointed this out in its third concept report. In Parlia-
ment, within the nascent environmentalist movement, 
and among the oystermen, there was growing criticism 
of Rijkswaterstaat’s closure schemes. They proposed an 
alternative approach: massive dike strengthening around 
the estuary.43 The critics were not completely ignored. In 
1969 the Delta Service added an environmental depart-
ment to investigate the biological richness in the area. 
Its researchers explored the estuary, the shores and 
mudflats of its tidal creeks, and its wetlands, aiming at 
the development of a management scheme for protecting 
threatened bird populations.44 But the closure scheme 
itself did not change one bit, as alternatives put forth 
by critics were ignored. Thus, the seeds of conflict were 
sown, and this conflict escalated in the early seventies 
to an unexpected and massive confrontation that would 
ultimately have a huge impact on the Rijkswaterstaat.
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
GROWING ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN
In the 1950s and 1960s Dutch water management was 
strongly oriented towards safety and economic inter-
ests—fresh water supply, transport, and agriculture. The 
emergence of large-scale agriculture not only destroyed 
idyllic landscapes, but also demanded strict water level 
management. Waterlogged fields were anathema to an 
efficient agricultural enterprise whose only aim was to 
maximize production. To this end, water levels had to be 
stabilized, that is, kept under tight control. This was no 
boon to biodiversity. 
The emphasis on social-economic issues in politics 
and in public opinion seems, for many years, to have 
suppressed widespread environmental criticism. Until 
the mid-sixties, there were few protests against the 
destructive aspects of economic modernization. After all, 
the social benefits were obvious: rapid economic growth, 
full employment, low inflation. The growing environ-
mental side effects thus remained largely unnoticed and 
beyond the political horizon. 
At least until the early 1960s public opinion was 
equally indifferent. Critical reflections on environ-
mental issues were rare. This was due not only to 
the social-economic bias of the media but also to 
ignorance of environmental effects. Little research 
had been done on pollution, biodiversity, or other 
ecological issues. Although after 1957 institutes for 
fundamental environmental research were established, 
applied research remained restricted to analyses of 
toxicological effects of chemicals on human safety and 
health. Conservation organizations retained their tradi-
tional focus on preserving natural zones and promoting 
environmental education, but refrained from widening 
their scope of action. 
However, this reticent attitude met with growing 
criticism as environmental awareness grew during the 
1960s. Initially, this mental shift was mainly the result 
of negative publicity about pesticides. One pesticide, 
DDT, became notorious after the publication of Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring (1962). DDT, she argued, had very 
detrimental effects on birds. Moreover, she argued, the 
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chemical industry manipulated information about the 
side effects of pesticides. Carson’s bleak picture shocked 
public opinion, not only in the U.S. but internationally. 
In 1965 the Dutch government established an advisory 
committee on pesticides, composed of biologists, toxi-
cologists, civil servants, and representatives from private 
industry. It advised on the side effects of pesticides 
and developed educational programs. Thus, Carson’s 
views, enriched with Dutch contributions, stimulated 
an environmentalist spirit that was congruent with the 
emerging trend of fundamental social critique that char-
acterized the 1960s. 
CULTURAL REVOLUTION OF THE SIXTIES
In the counter-cultural slipstream, new environmen-
talist groups began to flourish. Two of them criticized 
growing air pollution in the New Waterway area. A 
Waddenzee Association was set up to defend the natural 
values in this shallow sea. Finally, a protest group for 
an open Eastern Scheldt began to knock loudly on the 
Rijkswaterstaat’s door. But a group that agitated against 
the proposed establishment of a carbon disulfide plant 
by the chemical firm Progil in Amsterdam’s harbor had 
the most success. The anti-Progil group had a more 
radical strategy than the other environmentalist pres-
sure groups, which had a preference for engaging in 
dialog with the authorities. This moderate attitude bore 
a strong resemblance to that of the traditional conserva-
tionist organizations. But the Progil protestors created 
a media-strategy, broadcast environmental warning 
messages, and collected signatures. At the same time, 
they developed alternative options based on scientific 
research. But gradually, even the Progil group’s prag-
matic localism was overshadowed by more fundamental 
alternative views. The British economist E. J. Mishan, 
who took a stand against unbridled economic growth in 
his book The Costs of Economic Growth (1967), inspired 
the new environmentalists. In the 1970s anti-capitalist 
and anti-consumerist perspectives were much more 
vehemently articulated. Concomitantly, a systems 
approach emerged that questioned the dominant 
anthropocentrism inherent in economic growth policy 
and proposed instead a symbiotic relationship between 
humans and nature. This ecological paradigm was to 
have a profound impact on water management.45
ENVIRONMENTALISM AND WATER MANAGEMENT 
Deteriorating water quality was one of the main environ-
mentalist themes. This was hardly surprising, as research 
on this subject was more advanced than on other envi-
ronmental topics. In the 1930s a comprehensive water 
quality monitoring program had started, and in 1949 the 
environmentalist association Nederlandse Vereniging 
tegen Water-, Bodem-, en Lucht verontreiniging (NVWBL) 
presented the results in a multi-volume report. The 
latter inspired the NVWBL to plead again for adequate 
legislation. The drinking water enterprises started a 
Rhine water quality monitoring program, run by a joint 
committee. The freshwater fishing lobby also became 
committed to the campaign for cleaner water.46
In 1950 the water board of the Dommel (a small 
river in the south of the country) introduced a levy 
on pollutants and set up a purification board, funded 
by the levies, that pioneered riverine water quality 
management in the Netherlands. A few other purifica-
tion boards (De Donge, De Geul) were also established 
at this time. The government supported these activities 
and drew up a preliminary bill that sought to incorpo-
rate the Dommel Board’s polluter-pays principle into 
legislation. But this proposal languished because of 
resistance by the provinces. A revised bill that empow-
ered the provinces was submitted in 1958, but now the 
water boards were disgruntled. The stalemate was a 
thorn in the side of a number of organizations that were 
pursuing improved water quality.47 They successfully 
exerted pressure on the government to create effec-
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tive legislation. In 1964 the government presented a 
Surface Water Pollution Bill to Parliament. Water had to 
be suitable for the manufacture of drinking water and 
to be useful for industrial and agricultural purposes. 
Two principles were dominant: the polluter pays and 
pollution will be tackled at its source (rather than 
at the point of consumption). Wastewater discharge 
required a permit, and the discharge of specific polluting 
substances would be taxed. The bill created a more or 
less coherent legal framework, but it lacked an imple-
mentation strategy. No emissions standards were intro-
duced. No central monitoring coordination was outlined. 
The government was inclined to support bottom-up 
purification processes without clearly defining the role or 
nature of the inspection authorities.48 
The snail’s pace of legislation revealed a lack of envi-
ronmental commitment in political circles and within 
the Rijkswaterstaat. Infrastructure works and water 
quantity management still had a much higher priority. 
Generally speaking, environmental values were subor-
dinated to the dominant technocratic and economic 
orientation. Consequently, water pollution was not high 
on the political agenda. Similarly, most water boards 
were inclined to stick to their core business: water level 
management, irrigation, and drainage.49 This conserva-
tive attitude also had a cultural component, as most 
water board managers were farmers and thus inclined to 
give priority to agricultural interests.
Nevertheless, deteriorating water quality had 
become a major practical problem as a result of emis-
sions from petrochemical and chemical industries, the 
use of fertilizers and pesticides in agriculture, and the 
introduction of detergents into households. In 1959 tons 
of dead fish clogged the Hollandse IJssel and Rijnland 
waterways following poisonous waste disposals.50 In 
1961 a leftist weekly, Vrij Nederland, published a story 
about the pollution scandals in many waterways : a 
litany of poisoned fish, repugnant smells, and sulfuric 
acid drifting in a canal.51 Pollution could no longer be 
ignored: car emissions, smelly rivers, oil emissions in 
harbors—one could see, hear, and smell the deterio-
rating environment. “Environment” had ceased to be 
an abstract scientific formula; it had entered the realm 
of the senses. Sensory data were corroborated by an 
increasing mass of scientific data, as the national waste-
water research service Rijksdienst voor Zuivering van 
Afvalwater (RIZA) in 1964 standardized and expanded 
its river water quality measurements. 
This took place against the background of increasing 
international concern over environmental degrada-
tion. Water quality in the Rhine and Meuse deteriorated 
further because of chemical emissions and salt emis-
sions from French potash mines, German coal mines, 
and the soda industry. Not only did Dutch greenhouse 
enterprises suffer; the quality of fresh water supplies in 
central Holland deteriorated as well. In 1949 a gulf of 
poisonous effluents had finished off the already-ailing 
salmon population. In 1969 one of Hoechst’s chemical 
plants near Griesheim discharged the very poisonous 
effluent Endosulfan. Numerous Dutch weirs and water 
inlets had to be hastily closed to prevent a disaster. 
Concerned by this catastrophe, an international network 
of Rhine river municipal waterworks was set up, which 
Environmentalists protest against water pollution 
after a chemical plant discharged Endosulfan into 
the Rhine, 1969
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lobbied for adequate measures. By 1970 the Rhine had 
become a biological graveyard: oxygen had vanished 
from the water, and aquatic life had all but disap-
peared.52 In response to the rapidly deteriorating water 
quality, international cooperation among the Rhine 
states intensified. This internationalization process is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 8. 
CONCLUSION
The period between 1900 and 1970 can justly be labeled 
as a technocratic era. Engineers increasingly acquired a 
mandate and were granted budgets to establish a policy 
agenda and to design solutions for a wide range of water 
resource issues. The gradual unfolding of a hydraulic 
technocracy took place against the background of the 
rise of an interventionist state starting in the 1890s and 
coming to full flower after World War I. The Zuiderzee 
project was the first major technocratic project. It was a 
long-term technological and social laboratory, in which 
engineers, agronomists, social scientists, and archi-
tects were mandated to create a new polder society on 
the reclaimed Zuiderzee soil. Top down-planning was 
strengthened during the German occupation (1940–
1945), and it is no coincidence that a national freshwater 
system emerged in these years, with the IJsselmeer 
freshwater reservoir and measures against salinization 
in the southwestern estuaries as elements of a compre-
hensive water resource system approach.
The period 1940–1970 was the heyday of the 
interventionist state. After the economic depression 
of the 1930s and the chaos and misery of World War 
II, a consensus emerged that the market could only 
guarantee economic progress if it was controlled and 
limited by the state. The fusion of Social-Democratic 
planning ideology with the Christian-Democratic 
zeal for social-economic cooperation gave rise to 
an expanding state, more or less counterbalanced 
by ongoing negotiations over wages and prices on 
the basis of consensus and compromise. Rapid and 
sustained economic growth, stimulated by liberaliza-
tion of international trade, industrialization, and agri-
cultural modernization bolstered an image of the state 
as modern, efficient, and rather successful. Politics and 
technology seemed increasingly intertwined, which 
was clearly demonstrated in a large number of major 
water resource management projects. 
How did the 1953 flood fit into this pattern? Ulti-
mately, the disaster demonstrated the failure of the 
traditional flood management system. Neither the 
water boards in the flooded regions nor the Rijks-
waterstaat had been able to establish a sufficient level 
of safety. Strikingly, the 1953 crisis did not shake the 
belief in the government’s problem-solving capabili-
ties. On the contrary, water management authorities 
were granted time and facilities to design new and 
better solutions. Though trust in authority was gener-
ally strong until the late 1960s, this is not the only 
explanation. There was, for instance, deep-seated 
discontent about other urgent problems, notably the 
housing shortage due to a rapidly growing popula-
tion and war damage.53 But the water management 
engineers were able to demonstrate very efficient tools 
that quickly restored confidence in their expertise. In 
the period 1890–1930 they had cultivated their collec-
tive knowledge, especially studying practical prob-
lems from the viewpoint of scientific and engineering 
theory, resulting in a growing mastery of complex 
water management problems. This new know-how was 
demonstrated not only in technological innovations 
but also in the organization of new complex networks 
among different stakeholders and between the Rijks-
waterstaat and its contractors. The Rijkswaterstaat had 
invested in its capability for innovation by setting up 
new research services and by developing its conceptual 
capabilities—a multifunctional water system approach 
(Wentholt), estuary closure concepts (Van Veen), and 
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a new safety risk philosophy (Wemelsfelder). The intel-
lectual and organizational capital accumulated in the 
previous decades now paid off as a large variety of 
technical and organizational solutions could be devel-
oped in a rather short time.54 The long-lasting postwar 
economic boom, ending in 1973, enabled rising levels 
of expenditure in water management and so created 
even more favorable circumstances in which engineers 
could demonstrate their skills. 
In the late 1960s the Rijkswaterstaat’s power reached 
its zenith. But then, in a matter of a few short years, its 
image became tarnished almost beyond recognition. 
The cultural revolt of the sixties, with its fundamental 
critique of established institutions—including the 
market system and the state—struck the Rijkswaterstaat 
in the heart. Environmentalism offered an alternative 
to the narrow economic and safety orientation of the 
engineers. The growing concern over the Eastern Scheldt 
closure was another and even more alarming signal 
of the changing attitude towards the Rijkswaterstaat’s 
modernist engineering, its technocratic values, and its 
top-down decision-making procedures. For decades, 
these characteristics had underpinned the Rijkswater-
staat’s shining reputation, but now they were becoming 
the stakes of political struggle and social conflict. Simi-
larly, the water boards had to adjust to environmen-
talism and growing public participation. A long and 
challenging process of adaptation began.
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